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The Transfer of Shipbuilding Knowledge
Reconstructing HMAS Warrego (Part 1)
Klaus Staubermann
By the end of the nineteenth century Glasgow had become one of the world’s centres
of naval and marine engineering. Engineers on the Clyde had managed to
establish a culture of scientific engineering, drawing on both theory and experi-
mentation. When in 1909 the newly established Australian Navy commissioned
five torpedo-boat destroyers, it was not surprising that shipbuilders from the Clyde
successfully tendered for the contract. However, the Australian Navy did not simply
want to acquire modern warships; they also wanted to learn how to build them.
Therefore, two destroyers were built in Glasgow, one, the HMAS Warrego, was
built, taken apart and rebuilt in Sydney, and two more were built in Sydney, using
the experience acquired from reconstructing HMAS Warrego. This first part of the
paper looks at shipbuilding on the Clyde and tries to understand the Australian
Navy’s reasoning behind the rebuilding of HMAS Warrego; a second part, which
will be forthcoming, aims to examine the shipbuilding and yard practices and their
appropriation in Australia.
In 1901 Australia’s six colonies received federal status and the
Commonwealth of Australia was formed. As much as independence was
welcomed by the Australians, feelings in London were more cautious, espe-
cially when Australia announced its plans to build its own Royal Navy. An
important part of Australia’s plans for independence was to build a fleet of
naval vessels as effective for its purposes as possible. When the Australian
Navy was established in 1909, the Australian Government was well aware
that its existent fleet would be insufficient for protecting a country of its size.
Putting its emphasis on coastal defence, plans were developed for a fleet of
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one 1st class destroyer, one 2nd class destroyer, six torpedo-boat destroyers,
and two torpedo boats.1 At this time Britain was the main supplier of such
naval ships, and its designs had been widely standardised by the Admiralty,
and fleets around the world, from Asia to South America, and supplied by
the British.2
With Australia’s extensive coastline and many rivers, the majority of the
fleet would be composed of fast and well-armed boats – criteria met by
Britain’s established torpedo-boat destroyers. The two large destroyers would
act as the Navy’s flag ship vessels and the two torpedo boats could be
employed for harbour defence.3
Building a fleet was not an easy task. Australia was keen to become
independent in naval shipbuilding but had little experience in this type of
work. As the Australian Prime Minister, Scottish-born Andrew Fisher, to
whom the project was so important that he personally oversaw it, was keen
to point out, that even if the government would be able to obtain designs and
plans from the London Admiralty, knowing how to build the ships would
still be ‘a question entirely of experience’.4
Not surprisingly, the Admiralty in London was not very forthcoming
with sharing their guarded knowledge, and was quick to let the Australian
government know it was not them who produced the designs but their
British contractors, who – of course – wanted to sell ships and not designs.
But when the Australian Government announced its plans to have the
coastal torpedo-boat destroyers designed and built in Britain, the response
from Australian trade commissions, labour organisations and learned
societies also was far from enthusiastic: they were quick to point out that
shipbuilding skills existed in Australia and that British shipwrights could
always visit Australia as consultants if required. At the time, Australia was in
the middle of building its first iron trawler and fishery vessel, the Federal
Trawler Endeavour, a ship of dimensions similar to the proposed coastal
destroyers, and skills could be transferred easily. There was no need to have
ships built in ‘the old country’ if the same could be achieved by Australian
shipyards.
The Australian Government took a slightly more critical view on this
matter, compared to the trade industry, and the Prime Minister, when meet-
ing with representatives of local trade and labour organisations, reminded
them that Australian shipbuilders had indeed a broad range of shipbuilding
skills but that building the destroyers required specialized knowledge still to
be acquired in Australia.
The Prime Minister did not doubt that Australian shipbuilders could
build the destroyers but argued that valuable time could be saved by drawing
on British designs and practices. He proposed to have two torpedo-boat
destroyers built in Britain, another built in Britain, taken apart, shipped to
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Australia and rebuilt there and three more built in Australia by Australian
shipyards. By doing so the government expected to obtain plans and specifi-
cations for the ships, to develop a naval dockyard, to build or order all rele-
vant machinery and, most important, to train its own shipbuilders. A crucial
part of the project was the Australian Government’s proposal to send lead-
ing artisans to Britain to gain knowledge in the specialities in craftsmanship
and methods in building destroyers.5
The role and importance of skills in naval shipbuilding had been well
understood by the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century. The
Glasgow naval architecture professor and Admiralty consultant, John
Harvard Biles, who became responsible for overseeing the building of the
Australian torpedo-boat destroyers in Britain, identified three professions
that were crucial for the successful design and construction of modern
battleships. First, there were the scientists, such as the chemists and metal-
lurgists, who developed the materials required for building light, stable ships.
Then, there were the naval architects, who designed the ships. Finally there
were the craftsmen, who turned the materials and designs into a completed
naval ship. As Biles summarised it in his James Watt anniversary lecture
given to the Greenock Philosophical Society in 1911: ‘The design and con-
struction of a modern battleship is seen to be a matter requiring great skill
and experience on the part of many men of different professions.’6
From the outset of the project it had been clear that a professional skill
transfer could only be successful if parts and components were interchange-
able, a common requirement for Admiralty ships and in Australia already
widely practised, for example, in locomotive building. The design for the
ships was to be based on the River Class destroyer, a highly successful
British export item at the time, with deliveries to countries as far as Brazil
and Chile. However, the successfully tendered design had to meet Australian
coastal requirements, including stability, operational radius and long-range
wireless.
Of the some eight British shipyards that tendered for the contract, a joint
venture of Fairfield’s and Denny’s in Glasgow was selected. Fairfield had an
excellent reputation for its work in thermodynamics and engine design and
Denny for its work on hydrodynamics and hull design. Furthermore, Denny
maintained a test tank on the river Leven (that meets the river Clyde) which
enabled it to put the Australian Government’s design specification to test
before the ships were built, thereby trying to ensure that especially the
Australian speed requirements were met.7 As Biles informed the Australian
Government, Fairfield’s and Denny’s tender was the lowest; with design,
strength, stability, price and delivery superior; and with expected time of
delivery the shortest. Furthermore, the tender included up to 20 Australians
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to be trained on the Scottish yards and the induction of Scottish men to work
in Australia and eventually settle there.
Professor Biles supervised the project and work closely with Commander
Clarkson, who had been delegated by the Australian Government to super-
vise the work. Four Australian engineers and 12–18 workmen would come to
Scotland. The shipyards would also train Australian naval staff for actual
service on the ships. The Australian workers going to the Clyde yards would
be paid by the yards but have their salaries topped up to Australian levels by
their government.8
Further contract arrangements included that speed trails would be per-
formed on both shallow and deep water and that the ship to be rebuilt in
Australia would only be dismantled when the test trails on the two Scottish-
built ships were completed. The names chosen for the first two ships were
HMAS Yarra and Paramatta, the third ship to be rebuilt in Australia would
be named Warrego, all named after Australian rivers.
The Australian Government still had to decide where to establish its new
naval shipyard. Several locations along the coast were investigated and sur-
veyed but finally proposals only sought from Sydney and Victoria. Victoria
could draw on its vast experience and machinery in locomotive building.
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Photo 1. Denny Test Tank, Dumbarton, where river class destroyer models were built and tested, as seen
today. Photo by the author.
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Sydney, however, had suitable machine and fitting shops, a foundry, pattern-
making shops, and a sufficient labour supply. Finally, it was the fact that the
Sydney yard, located on Cockatoo Island, built its own machinery that
turned the scales.9
Still, Cockatoo Island was far from perfect: Yes, there were machine tools
but many of them would be too small for the work to be done, such as turn-
ing large propeller shafts. And as the yard was on an island it would be
difficult to provide an iron and steel supply. But of all Australian dockyards,
Sydney was the most developed. The yard’s managers felt confident that they
could supply the 150 men required for the seven-months rebuilding of
Warrego. Labour organisations were keen to point out that they had some
400 apprentices available in relevant crafts. And the Australian Association
of Ship Joiners produced a list of skills and work they were able to provide to
ensure there was no overlap with British suppliers.
Delivering ships and boats abroad in parts and reassembling them was not
new and had been done many times before, for example with paddle
steamers, an experience the Glasgow yards could readily draw on.10 The hull
of the ship destined for Australia would be framed and planked, the boiler
and machinery would be assembled and all structural parts put together. The
ship would then be taken apart again, to be delivered in sections for comple-
tion in Australia. As a local witness put it, it would be: ‘erected, marked,
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Photo 2. Launch of the HMAS Parramatta torpedo boat destroyer at Fairfield, Glasgow, 1910. By courtesy
of the Mitchell Library, Glasgow.
bundled, and packed (including) propeller machinery, fittings and equip-
ment, index and other plans, rivets and bolts.’11
Prior to shipment, the naval architect would examine all parts, and
Australian workmen would supervise the packing in Scotland so they would
be able to identify all parts upon arrival in Sydney. The several hundred
sections, crates and packages for rebuilding the destroyer would then be
shipped in several loads by steamships on route to Australia. Some items
were to be delivered directly from suppliers in Britain, such as the water tank
coating from its London manufacturer, together with instructions on how to
apply it.
Shipping a dismantled iron battleship around the globe posed challenges
and several frames were damaged in transport – and as Australian workers
pointed out with professional pride, repaired quickly. However, a public
debate ensued about who was to blame for the more than 500 damaged
items. Had it been due to poor packing by British yards or poor handling by
the Australians? The debate was covered at great length by the Australian
paper SUN, which wondered if perhaps the British had supplied the
Australians with faulty material. Eventually the Australian Government
intervened in order to close the debate and to re-establish public trust in
British engineering and workmanship.
But what types of knowledge were transferred during the rebuilding exer-
cise? One must examine carefully what type of training was necessary and
useful for what type of activity. A formal training might be useful for the
design of a new ship or engine but might not necessarily benefit operating a
machine on the shop floor. Also, no strict line between different forms of
training can be drawn. For example, a more formally educated engineer could
well have received a practical training though an apprenticeship. It would not
have been unusual for him to have received training abroad or to have con-
ducted studies or training on his own. A machine operator might have taken
evening classes or attended college, which were common ways to acquire
technical knowledge in Scotland at the time.
A form of training that has often been neglected by historians but thank-
fully has received more attention recently is the role of apprenticeships.
Apprenticeships, both in Britain and Australia, had a long and established
tradition, much longer than formal training, and were widely used for engin-
eering education. An apprenticeship could take several years and was often
based on a highly personal work relationship between apprentice and master.
One also needs to keep in mind that apprenticeships often extended beyond
the work relationship of master and apprentice. Especially in large industrial
centres such as Glasgow, the learning of new skills and practices would not
end at the factory gates. Skill transfer could for example take place within a
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family where family members worked in the same trade, sometimes over
generations.12
What does technical training include? Reading and understanding blue
prints, orders, instruction manuals, and machine charts was essential for any
meaningful technical work. Machine tools provide one example: reference
lines had to be marked on the work piece. The tools had to be installed and
the work piece had to be secured properly in its holder. The lathe had to be
adjusted and the speed, feed rates, and depths of cuts to be selected. The flow
of coolant had to be controlled and chips had to be removed. Last but not
least the lathe had to be maintained and worn out tools had to be replaced.
In a larger shipyard an operator could specialize, for example as a set-up or
production operator. Other practices were more ubiquitous such as posture
(never lean on the lathe, protect your eyes, do not touch moving parts), cloth-
ing (wear tightly fitting clothing, roll up sleeves, remove rings and watches),
or environment (keep your work-area oil free, earth an electric machine etc.).
A significant amount of technical knowledge can only be experienced and
understood through practice itself. This was a well-known fact to ship-
builders both in Australia and Britain at the turn of the nineteenth to the
twentieth century. This is why Australian shipbuilders continued to train in
Britain and when Denny and Fairfield tendered for HMAS Warrego, the
tender included for Scottish shipbuilders such as fitters and turners to settle
in Australia.
Was the rebuilding of the Warrego and the envisioned knowledge transfer
a success? If a ship launch is an indication of a shipbuilding success then it
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Photo 3. HMAS Warrego torpedo boat destroyer, anchored at Hobart, Tasmania during a fleet regatta,
1919–1920. By courtesy of the National Maritime Museum, London.
certainly was: HMAS Paramatta was launched at Fairfield’s in 1909, HMAS
Yarra by Denny’s in the same year, and the reconstructed HMAS Warrego
launched in Sydney harbour in April 1911, two years after it had been con-
structed in Scotland.
However, transferring shipbuilding knowledge had not been free of diffi-
culties and there had been some delays with the Warrego’s reconstruction. The
seven months anticipated for the completion of Warrego on Cockatoo Island
had turned out to be too limited. Rebuilding Warrego had required consider-
ably more time, labour and skill than the original construction had. Skills and
knowledge acquired on the Glasgow yard had to be both transferred and
implemented in Sydney. But once Warrego had been successfully completed
the remaining three Australian-built destroyers were constructed quickly and
in 1912 the HMAS Huon, the first fully Australian built naval steel vessel
was launched. Boiler making might serve as another example here. Based on
the boiler received with Warrego a new boiler was designed and constructed
for Houn in Sydney and from then on naval boilers were produced in large
numbers on Cockatoo Island into the 1950s.13
Although it had been engineers from Sydney University advising the
Australian Commonwealth’s Navy during the rebuilding project, it was the
Technical College in Sydney that benefited most from the reconstruction
exercise. By the time all torpedo-boat destroyers had been completed the
College had successfully established marine engineering in its syllabus.
Subjects covered included the construction of light and heavy duty engines,
gears and propellers, screws, their installation and much more, all required
for building naval ships.14 Ten years after the Australian Navy ambitious
project had been launched the syllabus already covered more than 30 subject
areas. Training was not confined to the campus and included practical train-
ing in the yards.
In the second part of this article (co-authored with Alexander Hayward)
we will examine in detail what skills and technologies were transferred
from Glasgow to Sydney and what machinery and tools were needed and
acquired by the naval yard in Australia, and we plan to make available an
inventory of Scottish-made machine tools used at Cockatoo Island at the
time Warrego and her sister ships were built.15 We also will further examine
the role and relationship of apprenticeships and engineering training on
Cockatoo Island and how newly acquired shipbuilding skills became institu-
tionalised in Sydney and elsewhere. Looking more closely at the actual
skills, training, machinery and yard practices will enable us to address broader
questions about replication of action and knowledge. This in return will
enable us to contribute to on-going discussions on what humans – and
machines – can do.16
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NOTES
1 For an introduction to the Australian Royal Navy see D. Stevens and J. Reeve, eds., Navy and the
Nation (Sydney, 2005). For an introduction to naval engineering in Britain see P.M. Rippon,
Evolution of Engineering in the Royal Navy, Vol. 1: 1827–1939 (Tiptree, 1988).
2 This early area of the Australian Navy has been canvassed by several authors; however, little or
no attention has been paid to the transfer of shipbuilding knowledge. For one of the more com-
prehensive studies see J. Jeremy, Cockatoo Island (Sydney, 2005).
3 Torpedo-boat destroyers combined two state-of-the-art technologies of the late nineteenth
century: high speed, facilitated by turbine engines, and self-propelled torpedos. See, for example,
T.D. Manning, The British Destroyer (London, 1961), J.H. Biles, The modern battleship: the James
Watt Anniversary Lecture given to the Greenock Philosophical Society, 20th January, 1911 (Glasgow,
1911).
4 NAA: MP1049/14, 1911/3652.
5 NAA: MP1049/14, 1911/3652. No records have been identified yet who these men were and
what trades they represented. This will form a crucial part of our planned fieldwork in Australia.
6 Biles, The modern battleship (n. 3 above).
7 The Denny Tank in Dumbarton is maintained as a museum today and its machinery is part of
National Museums Scotland.
8 UGD: 3/5/0460, the contract was largely negotiated by Fairfield and much of the contractual
material is still in existence.
9 For an introduction to Cockatoo Island see Jeremy, Cockatoo Island (n. 2 above).
10 Lake steamers are one good example, such as the still active SS Walter Scott (1899) on Loch
Katrine.
11 NAA: MP1049/14, 1911/3652.
12 J. Lane, Apprenticeships in England, 1600–1914 (London, 1996). Apprenticeships in Scotland did
not differ much from those in England. See, for example, K. Staubermann, ‘What machine tools
can tell us about historic skills and knowledge’, International Journal for the History of Engineering
and Technology, 80:1 (2010): 119–132.
13 M. Richards, Workhorses in Australian Waters (Wahroonga, 1987), 88.
14 Sydney Technical College Handbooks, years 1915, 1916, 1921, 1930. I am grateful to the State
Library of New South Wales.
15 Tentatively scheduled for publication in ICON at the end of 2015.
16 H. Collins, M. Kusch, The Shape of Actions (Cambridge, MA, 1998).
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